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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Whether the policy underlying Article 5531 is wise or not
would seem to be within the province of the legislature, which un-
doubtedly intended for such limitation to apply to any suit for
specific performance. But the courts have seemingly stripped the
article of a large portion of whatever policy the legislature meant
to establish when it was enacted.
Completely aside from the distinction in terminology between
"equitable title" and "equitable right," and regardless of the term
by which the vendee's interest in an executory contract is labeled
in various situations, it is submitted that with respect to questions
of descent and distribution, transmission of property by will, sep-
arate and community property, risk of loss, insurance coverage,
and questions of similar import, the rule applying to the vendee
as owner of equitable title in other jurisdictions should be applied
to the "equitable right" of the Texas vendee.
Richard E. Batson, Jr.
A PROMISE TO WAIVE A DEBT AS INSURANCE
A GREAT factor in the development of our world civilization
has been the business of insurance. The history of insurance
has been traced to a time before Christ. In the field of English
and American jurisprudence insurance developed, in its early
stages, in marine law. An early writer has said, "Insurance gives
great security to the fortunes of private people, and by dividing
amongst many that loss, which would ruin an individual, make it
fall light and easy, upon the whole society."' Today, insurance is
one of the largest business activities in the world.
With the vast development of insurance and its importance to
the public welfare came the many complex statutory regulations,
designed primarily for the protection of the public. Fully realiz-
ing the importance of the business of insurance, one is surprised
1 PARK'S INSURANCE (1800) ii.
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to find that there is no definition of insurance in the Texas statutes.
Lack of such definition may prove unfortunate.
In a recent case a Texas court of civil appeals held that the
following contract was not one of insurance. D desired to borrow
money from W, who was engaged in the business of making loans.
In the loan contract there was a provision for the payment of a
stated consideration in return for the agreement of W to cancel
the debt in the event that D died; to cancel payments during total
disability of D due to illness or accident; and to suspend payments
during inability of D to work due to inclement weather. Reversing
the lower court, the court of civil appeals held this contract to be
one of waiver rather than for usurious interest, and enforceable
as such. The court said:
"Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party for
a consideration assumes particular risks of the other party and
promises to pay him or some one named by him a certain or ascer-
tainable sum of money on a specified contingency.... Since the agree-
ment of the appellant and appellee does not provide for the payment
of a sum of money in the event of death, sickness, etc., it obviously
is not a policy of insurance; and the parties stipulated in the agree-
ment that the contract was not to be construed as a policy of insur-
ance."
2
It is believed that the court failed to give a proper interpreta-
tion of policy and precedent dealing with the problem of what is
insurance. There being no statutory definition of the term "insur-
ance," it would seem to be admitted, absent any indication to the
contrary by the legislature, that the common law definition of in-
surance is in effect in Texas.' Blackstone is cited as having defined
insurance as "a contract by which the insurer undertakes, in con-
sideration of a premium equivalent to the hazard run, to in-
2 Denton v. Ware, 228 S. W. 2d 867, 870 (Amarillo Civ. App. 1949) rehearing
denied (1950). It is to be noted that both Denton and Ware operate loan businesses
in Dallas, Texas, and that the case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed state-
ment of facts.
3 Tx. Rav. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1.
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demnify the person insured against certain perils or losses, or
against some particular event."4
It will be noted that this definition does not limit indemnifi-
cation solely to the payment of an ascertainable sum of money.
But in an early Massachusetts case there was engrafted upon the
common law definition the requirement of the payment of an ascer-
tainable sum of money.6 Texas subsequently adopted the definition
stated in the Massachusetts case.' Texas has consistently required
the payment of a sum certain in money,7 save in one instance. In
the case of National Auto Service Corporation v. State' the court
defined insurance in substance as an agreement by which one
party, for a consideration, promises to pay money or its equivalent
or to do some act of value to the assured upon the destruction or
injury of something in which the other party has an interest. This
definition is believed to cover all the types of insurance now in
vogue. The definition is in substance the same definition as that
adopted in Massachusetts by statute.9 It has been stated that the
definition does not differ in any essential from the common law
definition.'0
A brief review of authorities from other jurisdictions shows
that payment of an ascertainable sum of money is not essential
to an insurance contract. In a contract by which a buyer was
protected from defects in an article and certain other contingencies
not inherent in the article, the court, after defining insurance as
requiring a promise to pay an ascertainable sum of money, said,
IPsMM's INSURANCES (1800) ii.
'- Commonwealth v. Weatherbee, 105 Mass. 149 (1870).
6 Legion of Honor v. Larmour, 81 Tex. 71, 16 S. W. 633 (1891); Farmer v. State,
69 Tex. 276, 7 S. W. 220 (1888).
7 Legion of Honor v. Larmour, 81 Tex. 71, 16 S. W. 633 (1891) ; Farmer v. State,
69 Tex. 561, 7 S. W. 220; Phillips v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. Rep. 430, 125 S. W. 2d 585
(1939) ; American National Insurance Co. v. Brawner, 93 S. W. 2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.
(1936) er. dism'd.
8 55 S. W. 2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er. dism'd.
9 MAss. GEN. LAws (Ter. Ed. 1932) c. 175, § 2.
10 Atty. Gen. ex rel. Monk v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371, 372
(1924), 88 A.L.R. 275 (1934).
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".... [T] o constitute insurance the promise need not be one for the
payment of money, but may be its equivalent or some act of value
to the insured upon the injury or destruction of the specified prop-
erty.'
An undertaking on the part of one selling merchandise on the
installment plan to cancel the debt in case the buyer dies before
satisfaction is insurance within the meaning of a statute prohibit-
ing the making of insurance contracts except by companies, and
in a manner, authorized by law.'2 A contract to furnish an attor-
ney without cost to the owner of an automobile in court proceed-
ings growing out of the operation of his automobile is a contract
of insurance." A contract for the sale of land which provides that
on death of the purchaser the balance of the installments shall be
cancelled, and the deed to the lot delivered, is a contract of in-
surance. 4 One case involved a contract similar to the one in the
instant case and reached a unique solution. The court in effect
stated, the contract was devised to evade either the insurance or
usury laws. Taking plaintiff at his word that it was not a contract
of insurance, the court held it was a usurious contract 5 Thus,
there is ample authority that the common law definition of insur-
ance includes indemnification by means other than the payment
of money.
Aside from the authorities cited, there is an indication that the
Texas Legislature did not intend that a contract of insurance be
restricted to one containing a promise to pay an ascertainable sum
of money. Certain terms defined under the insurance statutes indi-
cate a broad definition of insurance:
11 State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N. E. 2d 256,
259 (1938), 119 A. L. R. 1236 (1939).
12 Case cited supra note 10.
13 Allin v. Motorist's Alliance, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S. W. 2d 19 (1930), 71 A. L. R.
688 (1931).
14 Arlington Cemetery Co. v. Baldridge, 19 Del. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 625 (1929). To the
same effect see Krumseig v. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co., 71 Fed. 350, aff'd, 172 U. S.
351 (1899) (determining question of usury) ; State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N. W.,
472 (1899) ; Barna v. Clifford County Estates, 143 Misc. 813, 258 N. Y. S. 671 (1932).




"Terms defined.-A life insurance company shall be deemed to be
a corporation doing business under any charter involving the pay-
ment of money or other thing of value, conditioned on the continu-
ance or cessation of human life.... An accident insurance company
shall be deemed to be a corporation doing business under any charter
involving the payment of money or other thing of value, conditioned
upon the injury, disablement or death of persons resulting from
traveling or general accidents by land or water. A health insurance
company shall be deemed to be a corporation doing business under
any charter involving the payment of any amount of money, or other
thing of value, conditioned upon loss by reason of disability due to
sickness or ill-health ... "16
In defining life, accident, and health insurance companies,
the legislature chose to describe the business of insurance, which
of necessity must consist of the making of contracts of insurance.
It would be very difficult to see how the legislature could more
aptly describe the business of making contracts of insurance than
by including therein what it considers to be, at least in part, the
substance of an insurance contract. At the very least, this statute
is indicative of an intent that insurance is not restricted to the
payment of a sum certain in money upon a specified contingency.
In further support of the proposition that the contract in ques-
tion is one of insurance, consider the result if the situation had
been this: D borrows money from X, and W promises for a con-
sideratioh that in the event of D's death or disability within one
year from the date of the loan, the installments having been paid
regularly by D, W will pay the balance of the loan. Such a con-
tract involves a payment of a sum certain in money, contingent
upon cessation of human life, and a court undoubtedly would hold
it to be one of insurance. But can it reasonably make any differ-
ence that W in the case stated performs both the functions of X
and W in the above instance and, instead of promising to pay
money, promises to waive or cancel the debt? It cannot be doubted
that in both instances there is a promise to do an act of value
16 Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4716. Emphasis added.
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contingent, or conditioned upon, the cessation of human life or
the occurrence of total disability.
It would seem a far better test, in determining whether a con-
tract is one of insurance, than the one that was applied in the
principal case is to ask the following question: is there a promise
to pay money or do something of value conditioned upon the
happening of some specified contingency, such as death, poor
health or accident? This test follows the indicated intent of the
legislature and is in accordance with common law authority and
statutory development.
There is further argument for applying this test. Just recently
the Texas Legislature has passed what is known as the Credit Life
Insurance Act." In Section 1. B. (1) several terms are defined:
" 'Credit Life Insurance', and 'Credit Health and Accident Insur-
ance' means personal insurance in which the insured are borrowers
of sums of money not exceeding One Thousand ($1000.00) Dollars
from lenders who retain an interest in the insurance as security to
the loan, and any other personal insurance written in connection with
or as part of such loan transaction. 'Credit Health Insurance' and
'Credit Health and Accident Insurance' as used in this Act shall
never be taken to mean or refer to any contract insuring performance
of any undertaking or agreement, and are expressly limited in their
coverage to the contingencies of death, or loss resulting from sick-
ness and accident."
It seems apparent from this statute that the type of contract
under consideration would not come within the meaning of the
act, unless the contract can be or is declared, in the first instance,
to be one of insurance; because the legislature used the term "in-
surance" throughout and did not define the term. In Section 4 of
the act the legislature declared its purpose in passing the act,
which was in substance to give the borrower an option in the pur-
chase of insurance, to prohibit coercion, and to give to the bor-
rower the right to choose his insurer and his insurance agent. With
regard to the type of contract under consideration, according to
17Acts 1949, c. 81; Tsx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1950) art. 4764c, §§ 1-16.
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principal case, the borrower is not protected as the legislature
desired. The requirement that the promise be to pay a sum cer-
tain in money contingent upon death, etc., has furnished an alto-
gether too easy method of evading both the usury statutes and the
statutes regulating insurance. The purpose of the statute mentioned
above is defeated, and loan companies are permitted to do a
flourishing business, uncontrolled in the issuance of the so-called
waiver contract.
In order to remove the doubt that exists and to eliminate con-
fusion, the legislature should define the term "insurance." The
following type of definition is suggested. A contract of insurance
is an agreement by which one party, for a consideration, promises
to pay money or its equivalent or to do some act (passive or
active) of value to the assured upon destruction or injury of
something in which the assured has an insurable interest.
For the aforementioned reasons it is believed that the contract
involved in the instant case is one of insurance, whether it be
called a waiver contract or something else. It is hoped, should our
courts be presented with this question again, that they will find
that as a matter of policy, as well as precedent, a contract of in-
surance should not be confined only to those instances where there
is a promise to pay an ascertainable sum of money in the event
of the occurrence of a specified contingency.
Calvin W. Holder.
